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81 
A Path to Peace in the U.S. Drug War: Why 
California Should Implement the Portuguese 
Model for Drug Decriminalization 
MALLORY WHITELAW* 
Scientific evidence and our concern for health and human rights 
must shape drug policy. This means making sure that fewer peo-
ple die from drug overdoses and that small-time offenders do 
not end up in jail where their drug problems get worse. It is time 
for a smarter, health-based approach to drug policy.  
 
Kofi Annan
1
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. is losing its very public war on drugs. Both at home and 
abroad, reformers balk at punitive drug policies that primarily employ the 
criminal justice system to control drug use, thereby incurring heavy eco-
nomic and social costs.2 Accordingly, unprecedented public support for 
easing the U.S. drug war has catalyzed state-level drug law reform across 
the country.3 Over twenty U.S. states have legalized medical marijuana.4 
 
  *  Mallory Whitelaw, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, Juris Doctor, May 2017. 
 1. Kofi Annan, Lift the Ban! Kofi Annan on Why It’s Time To Legalize Drugs, SPIEGEL 
ONLINE (Feb. 22, 2016), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/kofi-annan-on-why-drug-
bans-are-ineffective-a-1078402.html. 
 2. Christopher Ingraham, Global drug policy isn’t working. These 100+ organizations want 
that to change, WASH. POST (May 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/wonk/wp/2015/05/05/global-drug-policy-isnt-working-these-100-organizations-want-that-
to-change/. 
 3. Chris Boyette, It’s 2015: Is weed legal in your state?, CNN.COM (Jan. 7, 2015), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/07/us/recreational-marijuana-laws/. 
 4. Christine Hauser, Legal Marijuana Sales Hit $5.4 Billion in 2015, Report Says, N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/05/business/legal-marijuana-sales-2015-
report.html?_r=0. 
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Furthermore, several U.S. states now allow the recreational use of mari-
juana.5 Clearly, there is great public and legislative willingness to reform 
drug laws. 
My note will focus on this opportunity for states, California in par-
ticular, to continue along the path of liberalization by decriminalizing 
possession for all drugs. Furthermore, because U.S. states can be fertile 
testing ground for changes to federal law, drug decriminalization in Cal-
ifornia will be a worthy experiment that may pave the way for further de-
escalation of the U.S. drug war. To implement this change, I will argue 
that California should look to Portugal’s decriminalization of drug pos-
session as a proven model for liberalized drug policies. Following the 
Portuguese approach in California will have a positive effect on the 
state’s budget by alleviating the social and economic costs associated 
with drug criminalization. I will include specific predictions for how the 
state’s budget would be bolstered through refocusing the state’s resources 
from criminalization to public health, as Portugal has done since 2001. 
Section II discusses the failings of U.S. criminalization of drug pos-
session. It will address how the government is trapped in a “no-win” pat-
tern of costly over-incarceration, which actually exacerbates the drug ep-
idemic, both in addiction rates and in social ramifications, especially for 
vulnerable populations. Specifically, the section will discuss the eco-
nomic and structural burdens that criminalization places upon U.S. law 
enforcement, the penal system and the healthcare system. 
Section III will outline how the country is on the cusp of a new age 
of drug reform. The section will briefly discuss the growing recognition 
of the failing drug war, a few of the liberalized approaches to drug laws 
at the state level. In this spirit of reform, the U.S. should look to interna-
tional models, specifically Portugal’s decriminalization approach, for re-
form frameworks. 
Section IV will document how Portugal has decriminalized personal 
possession of all drugs. Portugal has implemented a system of regional 
panels that process most drug offenders, diverting users away from the 
courts and the penal system. The section will further outline how Portu-
gal’s system has had a positive impact on drug addiction, and reduced 
risky user behaviors and drug related illnesses. These results have allevi-
ated both the human and monetary costs of drug abuse. 
Section V will argue that California is well poised to implement 
highly progressive drug law reform. The state is faced with a drug-in-
duced public health crisis and heavily impacted prisons. Yet currently, 
 
 5. Id. 
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California perpetuates the costly and ineffective U.S. approach of crimi-
nalizing drug possession. The section will argue that despite the state’s 
recent reforms and its use of drug courts, California’s impacted prisons 
and strained budgets call for more drastic reform measures by rethinking 
the state’s drug laws. 
Section VI will argue that California should pave the way for pro-
gressive U.S. drug reform by implementing the Portuguese decriminali-
zation model. The section will outline the expected economic and social 
benefits of this model, working with the assumption that results would 
roughly mirror those seen in Portugal.  Section VII will outline potential 
legal and social obstacles to decriminalization in California. The note will 
conclude that California should be cautiously optimistic that Portuguese-
style decriminalization will offer substantial benefits and help pave the 
way for further nationwide liberalization of drug laws. 
II. STATISTICS SHOW THAT THE U.S.’S DRUG EPIDEMIC IS NOT A WAR 
THAT CAN BE WON USING A LAW ENFORCEMENT APPROACH 
Failed drug war policies have cost the U.S. dearly.6 Historically, 
U.S. and state governments have sunk their resources into reactive tactics 
to combat drug use, such as incarceration, to “stanch the flow” of drugs, 
instead of investing in preventative measures.7 In fact, for every dollar 
spent by federal and state governments to prevent addiction, fifty-nine 
dollars is spent “shovel[ing] up its wreckage.”8 This policy of only “treat-
ing the symptoms” of the drug epidemic creates a costly cycle for our 
healthcare system and for law enforcement, yet leaves us with no greater 
ability to understand or prevent the underlying causes of addiction.9 
Tactically, the U.S. chooses to address its drug problem primarily 
through its “love affair with lock and key.”10 This tactic has led to a heav-
ily incarcerated population.11 With over two million people in prisons and 
jails, the U.S. incarcerates more people per capita than any other coun-
try.12 About a quarter of these two million inmates are serving time for 
 
 6. See NATIONAL CENTER ON ADDICTION AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE, SHOVELING UP II: THE 
IMPACT OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE ON FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL BUDGETS i (CASA ed., 2009). 
 7. See id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See id. at ii–iii. 
 10. Too many laws, too many prisoners, THE ECONOMIST (July 22, 2010), http://www.econ-
omist.com/node/16636027. 
 11. NILA NATARAJAN ET AL., SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT AND PUBLIC SAFETY 1 (Jus-
tice Policy Institute ed., 2008). 
 12. Too many laws, too many prisoners, supra note 10. 
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drug offenses.13 As a result, our penal system is currently stretched be-
yond capacity. Prison overcrowding leads to unconstitutional conditions, 
which in turn leads to costly lawsuits.14 Equally troubling are the stark 
disparities in incarcerated populations; in 2014, 2.7% of the U.S. black 
male population and 1.1% of the U.S. Hispanic male population were 
serving sentences of at least one year, compared to less than 0.5% of the 
U.S. white male population.15 This means black males were over five 
times as likely as white males to serve a long sentence, with Hispanic 
males twice as likely as whites.16 
Despite the U.S. government’s exorbitant expenditures and over-
crowded prisons, these efforts to fight the drug war have not paid off.17 
Stateside illegal drug use persists, and in some areas, looms larger than it 
does overseas.18 For example, the prevalence of cocaine users in the U.S. 
is tied for first place with Spain. For amphetamines and opioids, U.S. us-
ers maintain a solid lead over all European counterparts in terms of us-
age.19 Indeed, a World Health Organization study of seventeen countries 
found that the U.S. had the highest rates of illegal drug use.20 The National 
Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse (CASA) found that forty mil-
lion Americans age twelve and over “meet the clinical criteria for addic-
tion.”21 CASA estimates that another eighty million are “risky substance 
users,” which means they use substances in ways that “threaten public 
health and safety.”22 Addiction and risky drug use also contribute to a 
variety of expensive health and social problems, including crime, child 
neglect and lost productivity.23 Accordingly, CASA estimates the U.S.’s 
failure to prevent problematic drug use may cost the government over 
$468 billion each year.24 
 
 13. NATARAJAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 1. 
 14. See AMANDA PETTERUTI ET AL., PRUNING PRISONS: HOW CUTTING CORRECTIONS CAN 
SAVE MONEY AND PROTECT PUBLIC SAFETY 7–8 (Justice Policy Institute ed., 2009). 
 15. E. ANN CARSON, PH.D., THE BUREAU OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2014 15 (Lynne 
McConnell & Jill Thomas eds., 2009). 
 16. Id. 
 17. See SHOVELING UP II, supra note 6, at i–iii. 
 18. Drug Use in America vs. Europe, RECOVERY BRANDS (July 22, 2010), http://recov-
erybrands.com/drugs-in-america-vs-europe/.  
 19. Id. 
 20. Alex Kreit, The Decriminalization Option: Should States Consider Moving from a 
Criminal to a Civil Drug Court Model?, 2010 U. CHI. L. REV. 299, 303 (2010) [hereinafter The 
Decriminalization Option]. 
 21. NATIONAL CENTER ON ADDICTION AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE, ADDICTION MEDICINE: 
CLOSING THE GAP BETWEEN SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 39 (CASA ed., 2012). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 39–40. 
 24. Id. at 2. 
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A recent national epidemic of overdose deaths from opioids, includ-
ing heroin, provides further evidence of our failing drug policies. In 2013, 
about 700,000 Americans took heroin, which is twice the number from a 
decade ago.25 This increase in the popularity of heroin may be due to a 
crackdown on liberal prescription of pain medications and increased 
smuggling operations from Mexico.26 Seizures of heroin at the U.S.-Mex-
ico border increased “from 560 [kilograms] in 2008 (1,230 [pounds]) to 
about 2,100 [kilograms]” in 2013.27 To exacerbate matters, a gram of pure 
heroin now sells for half of its 1980s price tag, enhancing its mass ap-
peal.28 This resurgence has proven deadly: the National Institute on Drug 
Abuse reports that between 2001 and 2015, there was a six-fold increase 
in the number of overdose deaths from heroin.29 
Despite these failures to stem the tide of illegal drug use, federal and 
state governments continue to combat this epidemic using law enforce-
ment and the penal system, even against low-level drug offenders.30 This 
approach places enormous burdens on public budgets and has strained 
our communities in the following ways. 
A. Criminalization places burdens upon law enforcement and the penal 
system 
In 2014, 1.5 million prisoners were held in the nation’s penal sys-
tem, with 50% of federal inmates and 15% of all male state prisoners 
convicted for drug offenses.31 A Harvard economist estimated that annual 
net state and local expenditures for enforcing drug prohibition are about 
$30 billion, with federal expenditures at about $15 billion.32 When the 
collateral costs of arrest and incarceration are factored in, such as remov-
ing convicted users from the job market, family hardship and opportunity 
 
 25. T.W., Why heroin has made a comeback in America, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 23 2014), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/11/economist-explains-19. 
 26. Id. 
 27. The great American relapse, THE ECOMOMIST (Nov. 2014), 
http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21633819-old-sickness-has-returned-haunt-new-
generation-great-american-relapse. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See Overdose Death Rates, NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE (revised Dec. 2015), 
http://www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates. 
 30. Federal Drug Sentencing Laws Bring High Cost, Low Return, THE PEW CHARITABLE 
TRUSTS (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2015/08
/federal-drug-sentencing-laws-bring-high-cost-low-return. 
 31. CARSON, supra note 15, at 16–17. 
 32. Jeffrey A. Miron, The Budgetary Implications of Drug Prohibition, HARV. U., DEP’T. OF 
ECON. 7–8 (2010), http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/miron/files/budget_2010_final_0.pdf. 
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costs, the U.S.’s law enforcement approach to drug use looks even more 
outlandishly expensive.33 
The high costs of this penal approach are felt most acutely in com-
munities of color. Although whites outnumber African-Americans by 
five to one in the U.S. population,34 and both groups use and sell drugs at 
similar rates,35 African-Americans are significantly more likely to be ar-
rested and jailed for a drug offense.36 Even after release from prison, ex-
isting policies continue to complicate the lives of ex-inmates. A prison 
record can lead to denial of child custody, voting rights, employment, 
business loans, student aid, and public housing.37 To make matters worse, 
the prison environment may exacerbate addiction or even create new ad-
dicts.38 This is partially due to widespread availability of drugs in prisons, 
but also to prisons’ ineffective drug treatment policies.39 All these collat-
eral factors combine to perpetuate addictions and create a second-class 
status that poses tremendous barriers to employment, housing, and stabil-
ity for individuals and communities.40 
Diverting substance-abusing prisoners to community drug treatment 
programs rather than prison could reduce crime rates and save our crimi-
nal justice system billions of dollars.41 These savings would result from 
immediate reductions in the cost of incarceration, and from reducing the 
crime level among successfully treated offenders.42 In fact, a study by 
 
 33. The Decriminalization Option, supra note 20, at 302. 
 34. Race and ethnicity in the United States Census, WIKIPEDIA (last updated Mar. 2, 2016), 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Race_and_ethnicity_in_the_United_States_Census. 
 35. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., RESULTS FROM THE 2013 NATIONAL SURVEY 
ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: SUMMARY OF NATIONAL FINDINGS 26 (2013), http://www.sam-
hsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUHresultsPDFWHTML2013/Web/NSDUHresults2013.pdf 
[hereinafter SUMMARY OF NATIONAL FINDINGS]. 
 36. Paul Waldman, Six Charts that Explain Why Our Prison System Is So Insane, THE AM. 
PROSPECT (Aug. 15, 2013), http://prospect.org/article/six-charts-explain-why-our-prison-system-
so-insane. 
 37. AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, DEFINING AND IMPLEMENTING A PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE 
TO DRUG USE AND MISUSE 2 (2013). 
 38. Megan McLemore, Prisons Are Making America’s Drug Problem Worse, POLITICO (Mar. 
2015), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/03/federal-bureau-of-prisons-medication-
assisted-therapy-115998. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See After Prison Roadblocks to Reentry, LEGAL ACTION CENTER 1–18 (2004), 
http://lac.org/roadblocks-to-reentry/upload/lacreport/LAC_PrintReport.pdf. 
 41. Diverting Individuals With Substance Use Disorders From Incarceration to Community 
Treatment Saves Billions, Prevents Crime, 1 CENTER FOR HEALTH & JUST. (2013), http:
//www.centerforhealthandjustice.org/FOJ%2003-13.pdf. 
 42. Id. 
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Crime and Delinquency estimates that if just ten percent of eligible of-
fenders were diverted into drug treatment programs, the criminal justice 
system would save $4.8 billion per year.43 
B. Criminalization places burdens upon the healthcare system 
The criminalization of drugs also exacerbates the dangers of illicit 
drugs, leading to greater difficulties for the healthcare system.44 For ex-
ample, the fear of being caught makes users less likely to engage with the 
healthcare system to obtain preventative care, which leads to more emer-
gency room visits.45 The threat of arrest also encourages riskier drug-us-
ing behavior, such as bingeing and poor sanitation in drug-using environ-
ments.46 Criminalization has also led to more overdose deaths because 
illicit drug markets encourage the sale of more potent forms of drugs. In 
addition, people are afraid to call 911 when they witness an overdose.47 
The CDC and the National Institute for Health have both recom-
mended wider access to medication-assisted treatments, including meth-
adone and buprenorphine. Yet only 9% of U.S. drug treatment facilities 
offer these treatments, and publicly funded treatment programs are even 
less likely to offer them.48 This lack of access to drug treatment not only 
results in untreated addiction, but also encourages behavior that puts drug 
users at an increased risk of HIV infection and heightens vulnerability to 
fatal overdoses.49 
In this system, it is unsurprising that only one in ten users seeks drug 
treatment.50 According to CASA, this leaves a treatment gap of 20.7 mil-
lion individuals, whose only “treatment” will occur in an emergency 
room.51 The vast majority of treatment referrals come from the criminal 
justice system, showing that addiction is typically addressed “only at the 
point at which it results in profound social consequences.”52 This creates 
 
 43. Gary A. Zarkin et al., Lifetime Benefits and Costs of Diverting Substance-Abusing Offend-
ers from State Prison, 61 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 14 (2012), https://jpo.wrlc.org/bitstream/handle
/11204/863/4342.pdf?sequence=1. 
 44. AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, supra note 37, at 1. 
 45. Id. at 2. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 5. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Five Year National Study Reveals: Addiction Treatment Neglected by U.S. Medical Sys-
tem, THE NAT’L CTR. ON ADDICTION AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE (June 26, 2012), http://www.cen-
teronaddiction.org/newsroom/press-releases/five-year-national-study-reveals-addiction-treatment-
neglected-us-medical. 
 51. ADDICTION MEDICINE, supra note 21, at 10. 
 52. Id. at 11. 
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a substantial burden on our healthcare system, including hospitals, which 
attribute almost a third of their inpatient costs to substance abuse and ad-
diction.53 The Department of Justice estimates that treatment for addiction 
and for drug-induced illnesses costs our healthcare system over $9 billion 
per year.54 In addition, CASA estimates that the U.S. government spends 
more than thirty times as much mitigating the health effects from sub-
stance abuse as it spends on “prevention, treatment and research.”55 With 
recent data showing that prevention programs create a $10 return for 
every $1 spent,56 it is clear that our government’s reliance on the criminal 
justice system to alleviate drug abuse is misguided, and prevention should 
instead focus on drug treatment and recovery. 
III. LOOKING AHEAD 
Thankfully, the public is beginning to take an increasingly honest 
look at failing U.S. drug policies. Recent measures show that a consider-
able groundswell exists for exploring alternative models.57 For example, 
the U.S. Sentencing Commission voted in 2014 to reduce sentencing 
guidelines for some drug offenses.58 This commission “prioritized con-
trolling federal prison costs” and recognized that the overcrowded penal 
system “makes prisons less safe for guards and inmates and makes suc-
cessful reentry programming more difficult.”59 The more notable liberal-
ization of drug laws seems to be happening at the state level, often 
through ballot measures.60 In 1996, California Proposition 215 was ap-
proved by 56% of the state’s voters.61 The measure allows patients and 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ILLICIT DRUG USE ON AMERICAN 
SOCIETY 24 (2011), http://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs44/44731/44731p.pdf [hereinafter 
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ILLICIT DRUG USE]. 
 55. ADDICTION MEDICINE, supra note 21, at 5. 
 56. STEVE AOS ET AL., THE COMPARATIVE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF PROGRAMS TO REDUCE 
CRIME (Wash. St. Inst. for Pub. Pol’y ed., 2001). 
 57. See State Medical Marijuana Laws, NCSL (Nov. 11, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/re-
search/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx. 
 58. See generally UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SENSIBLE SENTENCING 
REFORM: THE 2014 REDUCTION OF DRUG SENTENCES (2014), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/pdf/research-and-publications/backgrounders/profile_2014_drug_amendment.pdf. 
 59. Id. at 2. 
 60. See Aaron Smith, Forget Ohio. Ten more states try to legalize marijuana, CNN.COM 
(Nov. 4, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/11/04/news/marijuana-legalization-2016/. 
 61. California Proposition 215, the Medical Marijuana Initiative, BALLOTPEDIA (1996), 
https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_215,_the_Medical_Marijuana_Initia-
tive_%281996%29. 
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defined caregivers to possess and cultivate marijuana for medical pur-
poses.62 California is now one of over twenty states that have legalized 
and regulated medical marijuana.63 Recently, several states went a step 
further, legalizing the possession of marijuana for recreational use.64 De-
spite the tension between these new state laws and federal laws, the state 
laws remain valid and prevent state-level prosecution.65 
Sentencing for drug crimes has been another target for recent state 
reforms. California voters passed Proposition 47 in 2014, which reduced 
penalties for many drug offenses.66 Minnesota took similar measures in 
2015, with a commission voting to reduce prison sentences for some drug 
offenders,67 and Utah passed laws that favor treatment over incarceration 
for many drug offenses.68 
These state-level reforms show strong public willingness to rethink 
our system of drug criminalization and incarceration.69 However, par-
tially reduced sentences and some legalization of select substances will 
not sufficiently alleviate the impact of drug criminalization on govern-
ment budgets, public health, and communities.70 More drastic steps must 
be taken to end the drug war. This is because, even with reduced sen-
tences, many apprehensions for drug use will still burden the criminal 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. Hauser, supra note 4. 
 64. Smith, supra note 60. 
 65. See id. 
 66. Paige St. John, Prop. 47 passes, reducing some crime penalties, LOS ANGELES TIMES 
(Nov. 4, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-ff-prop-47-drug-possession-
20141103-story.html. 
 67. Abby Simons, Minn. Sentencing Guidelines Commission signs off on drug sentencing re-
form, STAR TRIB. (Dec. 30, 2015), http://www.startribune.com/commission-signs-off-on-drug-
sentencing-reform/363877211/. 
 68. Pamela Manson, New Utah drug laws favor treatment over incarceration, SALT LAKE 
TRIB. (Oct. 4, 2015), http://www.sltrib.com/home/3015846-155/new-utah-drug-laws-favor-treat-
ment. 
 69. See State Medical Marijuana Laws, supra note 57. 
 70. A study by the ACLU, which reviewed records from all 58 California counties, found 
variations in how Prop. 47 has affected law enforcement. See generally ACLU, CHANGING GEARS: 
CALIFORNIA’S SHIFT TO SMART JUSTICE (2015), https://www.acluca.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2015/11/Prop47_report_final1.pdf. Some counties have prioritized low-level arrests, while 
others deprioritized them. Id. at 7. “For example, the Fresno Sheriff’s Department reported that 
their arrests for low-level offenses went up by 77%” in the first six months of 2014 compared to 
the first six months of 2015, “while their Los Angeles counterpart reported an increase in low-level 
arrests of just 10%. In contrast, the Sacramento Sheriff’s Department reported that arrests for the 
same offenses were actually down by 43%.” Id. at 9. Additionally, the study found that jail popu-
lations fell after Prop. 47, but are rising again. Id. at 7; see also DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, WHY IS 
MARIJUANA DECRIMINALIZATION NOT ENOUGH? (2016), http://www.drugpolicy.org/sites/de-
fault/files/DPA_Fact%20sheet_Marijuana%20Decriminalization%20and%20Legalization_%28F
eb.%202016%29.pdf. 
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justice system, even for low-level offenses.71 Instead of “flying blind” in 
reforming our drug policies, the U.S. should look to international efforts, 
where proven models for reform already exist for guidance. Furthermore, 
the federal government should allow states to act as “laboratories” for 
testing new legislative models.72 Such state-level innovations allow for 
“novel…experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”73  
 Several European and South American countries have experimented 
with liberalized drug laws. Some have legalized selected narcotics, others 
have decriminalized them, while some have decided not to enforce their 
drug laws in certain circumstances.74 Portugal decriminalized the use, 
possession and acquisition of all narcotics in 2001.75 This change in-
cluded a two-fold approach: (1) the end of penal sanctions for drug pos-
session and the re-routing of drug offenses to regional panels, and (2) a 
health-oriented approach to addressing problematic drug use.76 This na-
tional strategy has led to an increase in treatment, decreased use of several 
dangerous drugs and a decrease in drug-related death and illness in Por-
tugal.77 States should implement this successful model for decriminaliza-
tion, thereby proving to the rest of the country that the framework will 
produce better results at a lower cost than our criminal justice approach. 
 
 71. Brenda Gazzar, Prop. 47 arrests uneven, wide differences in how police are adapting to 
law, ACLU says, LOS ANGELES DAILY NEWS (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.dailynews.com/govern-
ment-and-politics/20151111/prop-47-arrests-uneven-wide-differences-in-how-police-are-adapt-
ing-to-law-aclu-says. 
 72. Erwin Chemerinsky & Allen Hopper, On pot laws, respect the states, LOS ANGELES 
TIMES (Mar. 27, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/27/opinion/la-oe-chemerinsky-mari-
juana-legalization-20130327. 
 73. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 74. See Malena Castaldi & Felipe Llambias, Uruguay becomes first country to legalize mari-
juana trade, REUTERS (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-uruguay-marijuana-
vote-idUSBRE9BA01520131211. See also Edward Delman, Is Smoking Weed a Human Right?, 
THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/11/mexico-
marijuana-legal-human-right/415017/; Drug liberalization, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org
/wiki/Drug_liberalization (last modified Jan. 2016). 
 75. Caitlin Hughes & Alex Stevens, The Effects of Decriminalization of Drug Use in Portugal, 
THE BECKLEY FOUND. DRUG POL’Y PROGRAMME 1 (2007), http://core.ac.uk/download/files
/57/91904.pdf. 
 76. Id. at 2. 
 77. Id. at 3. 
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IV. PORTUGAL’S PUBLIC HEALTH APPROACH TO DRUG ABUSE IS MORE 
EFFECTUVE AND LESS COSTLY THAN CRIMINALIZATION 
Portugal decriminalized drugs over fifteen years ago.78 Although 
differing opinions exist about the new framework’s success,79 many feel 
the reformed laws have decreased the stigma attached to drug addiction 
and alleviated drug problems within the country.80 Drug use has declined 
for certain groups, public willingness to seek treatment has improved and 
prison populations have decreased.81 Overall, Portuguese decriminaliza-
tion has emerged as a promising alternative to the drug war.82 
A. History of Portuguese Decriminalization 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Portugal struggled with a serious 
drug problem.83 This was partially attributed to the country’s location in 
the southwestern corner of Europe, which makes it a handy gateway for 
drug traffickers from Brazil, Mexico, Spain, and Morocco.84 Although 
many of the drugs funneled through Portugal are destined for the external 
market, the country began to have serious problems with intravenous her-
oin users.85 This problem was most visible in Lisbon’s Casal Ventoso 
neighborhood, where intravenous heroin users obtained their drugs 
through open-air drug markets.86 
Like the U.S., Portugal first focused on a law enforcement approach 
to its soaring rates of addiction and other drug-related casualties.87  This 
approach did not pay off; by 1999 the country saw record numbers of 
addicts88 and had the highest rate of HIV infection among injecting drug 
 
 78. Id. at 3. 
 79. See George Murkin, Drug Decriminalisation in Portugal: Setting the Record Straight, 
TRANSFORM 1 (2014) [hereinafter Setting the Record Straight]. 
 80. GLENN GREENWALD, DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION IN PORTUGAL: LESSONS FOR 
CREATING FAIR AND SUCCESSFUL DRUG POLICIES 6 (2009). 
 81. See generally id. 
 82. See id. at 27–28. 
 83. See Kellen Russoniello, Note, The Devil (and Drugs) in the Details: Portugal’s Focus on 
Public Health as a Model for Decriminalization of Drugs in Mexico, 12 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. 
& ETHICS 370, 380–83 (2013) [hereinafter The Devil (and Drugs) in the Details]. 
 84. Caitlin Elizabeth Hughes & Alex Stevens, What Can We Learn From The Portuguese 
Decriminalization Of Illicit Drugs?, 50 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 999, 1001 (2010) [hereinafter What 
Can We Learn]. 
 85. Id. 
 86. The Devil (and Drugs) in the Details, supra note 83, at 373. 
 87. Id. at 380–83. 
 88. Susan Ferreira, Portugal’s Drug Law Draws New Scrutiny, WALL ST. J. (2010), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303411604575168231982388308 (reporting that 
1% of Portugal’s population was addicted to illegal drugs). This number is comparable to current 
U.S. statistics. For example, in 2013, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services estimates 2.6 
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users in the European Union.89 Throughout this period, Portugal slowly 
recognized the need for a new approach to its drug problem.90 The coun-
try’s criminal justice approach stigmatized users and only seemed to ex-
acerbate problematic drug use.91 Researchers and policy makers began to 
challenge the dominant “zero tolerance” dogma, and health professionals 
advocated a paradigm-shift to a more functional, humanitarian approach 
to addressing illicit drug use.92 In 2001, this new pragmatism finally led 
to the passage of Law 30/2000.93 
Law 30/2000 made Portugal the first country to fully decriminalize 
possession of drugs for personal use.94 The country’s shift to a public 
health approach signaled an acceptance that, for many users, expectations 
of absolute sobriety was neither realistic nor possible. A more realistic 
approach was harm reduction: reduce the risk individuals posed to them-
selves and to the public by helping them manage their addiction, instead 
of by applying a zero tolerance policy across the board.95 
 
percent of persons aged 12 or older were addicted to illicit drugs in 2013. SUMMARY OF NATIONAL 
FINDINGS, supra note 35, at 82. 
 89. Jordan Blair Woods, A Decade After Drug Decriminalization: What Can The United 
States Learn From The Portuguese Model?, 15 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 1, 20 (2011) [hereinafter A 
Decade After Drug Decriminalization]. 
 90. The Devil (and Drugs) in the Details, supra note 83, at 383–85. 
 91. Caitlin Elizabeth Hughes, Overcoming obstacles to reform? Making and shaping drug 
policy in contemporary Portugal and Australia 85 (2006) (unpublished PhD thesis, Department of 
Criminology, University of Melbourne),  https://minerva-access.unimelb.edu.au/bitstream/handle/
11343/39229/67255_00003215_01_Caitlin_Hughes_Thesis.pdf?sequence=1. 
 92. Id  at 222. 
 93. See Lei n.° 30/2000 de 29 de Novembro [Law 30/2000 of the 29th of November]. Article 
2 reclassifies consumption, acquisition and possession as an administrative offense, within estab-
lished quantities; Article 3 establishes confidentiality for those requesting drug treatment and for 
medical providers; Article 4 allows for seizure and identification; Article 5 establishes civil drug 
dissuasion panels, operating under the Portuguese Institute on Drug and Drug Addiction; Article 6 
establishes a central register; Article 7 lays out the structure and appointment of commissions; Ar-
ticle 8 outlines the jurisdictions of the commissions; Article 9 calls for the commissions’ coopera-
tion with other health services, welfare services and police; Article 10 enumerates the factors the 
commissions will use to evaluate the drug use in question, including requests for medical exami-
nation; Article 11 specifies circumstances where proceedings will be suspended; Article 12 and 13 
specify ways to submit to treatment and the duration of suspension; Articles 14-20 outline penalties, 
suspension of penalties and warnings; Articles 21-24 specify periodic attendance at health pro-
grams, notification of failure to comply, effects of suspension, duration of penalties and compli-
ance. Id. 
 94. Maia Szalavitz, Drugs in Portugal: Did Decriminalization Work?, TIME MAG. (Apr. 2, 
2009), http://content.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1893946,00.html. 
 95. What Can We Learn, supra note 84, at 1005. 
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B. Drug Possession is Now An Administrative Offense in Portugal 
Portugal’s new approach is defined by decriminalization, not legal-
ization. This means that purchase, possession and consumption of drugs 
for personal use are still illegal and subject to police intervention. But 
violations are now exclusively administrative offenses96 and no longer 
burden the criminal justice system.97 Drug trafficking endures as a crim-
inal offense and remains in the realm of the courts and the penal system.98 
For those caught with a ten-day supply or less of any drug,99 includ-
ing hard drugs like heroin and crystal methamphetamine, there are no ar-
rests, prosecutions or prison sentences.100 Instead, the Portuguese law es-
tablished “Comissões para a Dissuasão da Toxicodependência” 
(Commissions for the Dissuasion of Drug Addiction), or “CDTs.”101 To 
adjudicate drug offenses, CDTs impose sanctions when appropriate, or 
let users off with a warning.102 
 
 96. DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION IN PORTUGAL, supra note 80, at 2; Lei n.° 30/2000 de 29 de 
Novembro, supra note 93, art 2 (“The consumption, acquisition, and possession for own consump-
tion of plants, substances, or preparations listed in the table referred to in preceding article consti-
tute an administrative offense.”). 
 97. DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION IN PORTUGAL, supra note 80, at 4 (“Even in the decriminal-
ization framework, police officers who observe drug use or possession are required to issue cita-
tions to the offender, but they are not permitted to make an arrest. The citation is sent to the com-
mission, and the administrative process will then commence. The cited offender appears before the 
commission within 72 hours of the citation’s issuance. If the commission finds compelling evidence 
of drug trafficking, it will refer the case to criminal court.”). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 2 (“one’s own consumption” is defined as a quantity “not exceeding the quantity 
required for an average individual consumption during a period of 10 days”). The quantities delin-
eated are one gram of heroin, one gram of ecstasy, one gram of amphetamines, two grams of co-
caine, or twenty-five grams of cannabis. Wiebke Hollersen, ‘This Is Working’: Portugal, 12 Years 
after Decriminalizing Drugs, DER SPIEGEL (Mar. 27, 2013), http://www.spiegel.de/interna-
tional/europe/ evaluating-drug-decriminalization-in-portugal-12-years-later-a-891060.html. See 
also Decreto-Lei n.° 15/93, de 22 de Janeiro [Decree-Law no. 15/93 of 22 January]. 
 100. DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION IN PORTUGAL, supra note 80, at 3. 
 101. Id. at 3. 
 102. Id; Lei n.° 30/2000 de 29 de Novembro, supra note 93, arts. 10–15 (“The commission 
shall hear the consumer and gather the information needed in order to reach a judgment as to 
whether he or she is an addict or not, what substances were consumed, the circumstances in which 
he was consuming drugs when summoned, the place of consumption and his economic situation 
. . . . The commission shall provisionally suspend proceedings whenever a consumer with no prior 
record of offences under this law is deemed to be a non-addicted consumer.  . . . The commission 
shall provisionally suspend proceedings whenever an addicted consumer with no prior record of 
previous proceedings for offences under this law agrees to undergo treatment. . . . The commission 
may provisionally suspend proceedings if an addicted consumer with a prior record of previous 
proceedings for offences under this law agrees to undergo treatment. . . . In applying penalties, the 
commission shall take into account the consumer’s circumstances and the nature and circumstances 
of consumption”). 
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There is one CDT for each of Portugal’s eighteen districts, and per 
Article 7 of Law 30/2000, each panel is comprised of three members.103 
Each member has a background in social service, medicine, or law.104 
CDTs cannot mandate treatment. Their primary aim is to dissuade drug 
use and to encourage dependent drug users to seek treatment for their 
addictions.105 Accordingly, a CDT can suspend a fine in exchange for a 
user’s agreement to seek treatment.106 For a user with an addiction or a 
prior record, stricter sanctions may apply, such as the suspension of a 
professional license.107 However, a CDT’s “sanction” may be as minor as 
a warning if the drug use is not deemed problematic and if the user will 
abstain from future use.108 
Because the overriding goal of decriminalization was to de-stigma-
tize drug users, a user’s visit to the CDT will focus on health instead of 
guilt. 109 The commission’s members strive to avoid any trappings of a 
courtroom, sitting at a table with the offender instead of elevated on a 
bench or podium and dressing casually.110 
The positive outcomes from Portugal’s new approach cannot be at-
tributed to decriminalization alone. The other “critical link” has been the 
reclassification of drug addiction as a medical problem.111 This new ap-
proach has alleviated the stigma and “red tape” surrounding drug treat-
ment and emphasized social solidarity between drug users and the rest of 
society.112 Portugal’s implementation of this national strategy has in-
creased the resources available for prevention, harm reduction, treatment, 
and social reintegration.113 Public health workers have played a critical 
role by building relationships with communities of at-risk users and 
 
 103. DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION IN PORTUGAL, supra note 80, at 4; Lei n.° 30/2000 de 29 de 
Novembro, supra note 93, art. 7.   
 104. DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION IN PORTUGAL, supra note 80, at 4. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Lei n.° 30/2000 de 29 de Novembro, supra note 93, art. 11 (“2. The commission shall 
provisionally suspend proceedings whenever an addicted consumer with no prior record of previous 
proceedings for offences under this law agrees to undergo treatment. 3. The commission may pro-
visionally suspend proceedings if an addicted consumer with a prior record of previous proceedings 
for offences under this law agrees to undergo treatment”). 
 107. DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION IN PORTUGAL, supra note 80, at 3; Lei n.° 30/2000 de 29 de 
Novembro, supra note 93, art. 17. 
 108. The Devil (and Drugs) in the Details, supra note 83, at 388; Lei n.° 30/2000 de 29 de 
Novembro, supra note 93, art. 18. 
 109. DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION IN PORTUGAL, supra note 80, at 6. 
 110. Id. 
 111. The Devil (and Drugs) in the Details, supra note 83, at 384–87. 
 112. Michael Tracey & Neima Jahromi, Importing the Portugese Model of Drug Reform, THE 
NATION (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.thenation.com/article/importing-portuguese-model-drug-re-
form/.  
 113. What Can We Learn, supra note 84, at 1002. 
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providing health services such as syringe-exchange programs, medica-
tion-assisted treatments, and supervised injection facilities.114 In some ar-
eas, teams of health workers in vans hand out fresh foil, offer needle ex-
changes, and supply methadone.115 These mobile teams comport with the 
bedrock principles of harm reduction: meeting people “where they’re at,” 
offering choices, and not coercing people into treatment.116 
Portugal’s accessible, health-oriented approach lies in sharp contrast 
to U.S. drug treatment, where methadone is more tightly controlled and 
monitored than all other prescription medications.117 Retrieving a metha-
done prescription from a neighborhood pharmacy is unheard of, let alone 
from a convenient mobile unit.118 In the U.S., methadone is only available 
in special clinics licensed by the DEA and can only be prescribed by des-
ignated doctors.119 The clinics are restrictive and humiliating; armed se-
curity guards patrol clinic halls and patients are separated from workers 
by bulletproof glass.120 
Meanwhile, Portugal’s increased resources for drug treatment have 
provided wider access to health services and lessened the impact of drug 
control on public budgets.121 Most data since decriminalization shows the 
Portuguese framework has been successful, both financially and from a 
health-oriented perspective.122 The country’s reforms even received the 
blessing of the International Narcotics Control Board, who is responsible 
for overseeing UN drug conventions.123  In 2004, the INCB conceded that 
Portugal’s two-pronged framework for decriminalization was in keeping 
with the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychoactive Substances because drug possession was still prohib-
ited, even if sanctions were administrative rather than criminal.124 
 
 114. The Devil (and Drugs) in the Details, supra note 83, at 383. 
 115. Lewis Panther, How Former Junkie Capital of Europe Portugal Halved Number of Ad-
dicts by Ending Prosecution of Users, MIRROR (Sept. 19, 2015), http://www.mir-
ror.co.uk/news/world-news/how-former-junkie-capital-europe-6477320. 
 116. Helen Redmond, The Power and the Beauty of Portuguese Drug Policy, ZNET.COM (Apr. 
10, 2012), https://zcomm.org/znetarticle/the-power-and-the-beauty-of-portuguese-drug-policy-by-
helen-redmond/ [hereinafter The Power and the Beauty].   
 117. Id. (“Unlike any other medication, the actual prescribing practices of methadone are dic-
tated and enforced at the federal level by the Center for Substance Abuse Treatment (CSAT), the 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), and the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration (DEA)”). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION IN PORTUGAL, supra note 80, at 4–10. 
 122. See id. 
 123. The Devil (and Drugs) in the Details, supra note 83, at 388–89. 
 124. Id. 
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C. Outcomes from Portugal’s decriminalization approach 
Since Portugal enacted decriminalization and harm reduction in 
2001, the country’s rates of drug use have declined in many categories, 
and “drug-related social ills” have been partially alleviated.125 Further-
more, while drug addiction and drug-associated problems continue to in-
crease across the EU, those problems have mostly declined in Portugal.126 
Funding for treatment programs—and addicts’ willingness to seek 
them—has improved substantially.127 The success of this public health 
approach has provided benefits for Portugal’s law enforcement, penal 
system, addiction rates, and public health.128 
1. Decriminalization Benefits Law Enforcement and the Penal System 
By turning low-level drug possession into an administrative offense 
rather than a criminal offense, decriminalization has led to a dramatic de-
cline in Portuguese drug arrests, “from over 14,000 in the year 2000, to 
around 5,500-6,000 per year once the policy came into effect.”129 A dra-
matic decrease in “crimes strongly linked to drugs” also ensued, decreas-
ing by as much as 60% for assaults, 30% for robberies, and 10% for 
theft.130 
The percentage of inmates convicted for drug-related offenses in 
Portuguese prisons also decreased—from 44% in 1999 to about 21% in 
2012.131 Prison density—the number of prisoners per 100 prison places—
likewise fell from 119 in 2001 to about 101 in 2005.132 Another bright 
spot for Portuguese prisons has been the falling rates of drug use within 
the prison system: between 2001 and 2007, prisoners’ heroin use declined 
by 14%.133  Overall, Portuguese decriminalization has resulted in consid-
erable efficiency for the court and prison systems. 
2. Decriminalization Helps to Alleviate Problematic Drug Use 
By many accounts, Portugal’s shift in drug policy has resulted in 
reduced addiction rates, and some of the lowest overall drug use in the 
 
 125. See DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION IN PORTUGAL, supra note 80, at 11–15. 
 126. See id. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See id. 
 129. SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT, supra note 79, at 6. 
 130. What Can We Learn, supra note 84, at 1009–10. Certain crimes, such as robbery, are 
strongly linked to drug use because they are sometimes committed to obtain money to support drug 
use. Drug-Related Crime, NCJ-149286 (Dep’t of Justice Sep. 1994) (fact sheet). 
 131. SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT, supra note 79, at 6. 
 132. What Can We Learn, supra note 84, at 1010. 
 133. Id. at 1010–11. 
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EU.134 Since decriminalization, lifetime prevalence rates, which measure 
lifetime drug use, have decreased for several age groups. For citizens be-
tween thirteen to fifteen years old, the rate decreased from 14.1% to 
10.6% in the first six years after decriminalization.135 For individuals aged 
sixteen to eighteen, that number decreased from 27.6% to 21.6%.136 “For 
some older age groups,” including nineteen to twenty-four year olds, 
“there has been a slight to mild increase in drug usage, generally from 
2001 to 2006.”137 Experts view a mild increase in lifetime drug use for 
the general population as virtually inevitable in all nations, regardless of 
their drug policies and regardless of whether there was an actual increase 
in drug use, due to the cohort effect; with the passage of time, older peo-
ple who have never tried drugs are replaced by a new generation, “among 
whom a significant percentage” have already tried drugs.138 
In observing the long-term effects of Portuguese drug policy, ex-
perts view drug use among adolescent and post-adolescent age groups, 
especially the age fifteen to twenty-four group, as the most significant. 
The use of drugs at this young age is considered one of the “harbingers 
for long-term behavioral changes.”139 While prevalence rates for this fif-
teen to twenty-four age group have increased slightly, “the rates for the 
critical [fifteen to nineteen] age group—critical because such a substan-
tial number of young citizens begin drug usage during these years—have 
actually decreased,” suggesting the prevalence of drug use in Portugal 
will continue to ebb.140 
Comparative usage rates across the European Union further high-
light the success of Portugal’s drug policies. For example, only five coun-
tries had a lower prevalence rate for cocaine usage than Portugal.141 For 
the fifteen to sixty-four age group, Portugal has the lowest lifetime prev-
alence rate for cannabis use, which is the most widely used drug in the 
EU.142 In fact, Portuguese cannabis prevalence is less than half of that of 
the majority of EU states.143 Statistics for amphetamines, ecstasy and her-
oin are similarly encouraging.144 Overall, the trend is clear: decriminali-
zation seems to have partially alleviated problematic drug use in Portugal. 
 
 134. DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION IN PORTUGAL, supra note 80, at 12. 
 135. Id. at 11. 
 136. Id. at 11–12. 
 137. Id. at 12. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 13. 
 140. Id. at 14. 
 141. Id. at 22. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See id. 
 144. Id. 
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3. Decriminalization Benefits the Healthcare System 
Portuguese decriminalization is likewise linked to a decrease in dis-
eases associated with intravenous drug use.145 For example, newly re-
ported cases of HIV and AIDS among addicts have declined.146 Between 
2001 and 2012, the number of HIV cases among injection drug users de-
creased from 1,016 to 56, and the number of AIDS cases among injection 
drug users decreased from 568 to 38.147 Before decriminalization, more 
than 50% of those infected with HIV in Portugal were drug addicts.148 
Now, addicts make up only 20% of new HIV cases.149 Portugal has also 
seen a small decrease in new hepatitis B and C infections nationwide 
since decriminalization.150 Analysts have attributed these improvements 
to the enhanced treatment programs that accompanied the legislative re-
forms.151 Additionally, by some accounts, drug-related deaths have de-
creased since decriminalization.152 According to clinical data, deaths due 
to drug use have dropped from approximately 80 in 2001, to 16 in 2012.153 
Overall, these successes indicate that Portugal’s two-pronged ap-
proach for drug decriminalization, now in place for over fifteen years, has 
improved the country’s drug situation on several fronts.154 By reducing 
the social stigma against addicts, the country’s policies help to encourage 
problematic drug users to seek treatment.155 In addition, removing most 
drug possession from the realm of criminal justice helped to free up re-
sources for providing treatment programs.156 Although the Portuguese ap-
proach to drug law reform may not achieve these exact results if imple-
mented outside of Portugal, it can provide U.S. states with a proven 
model for cautious experiments with drug war de-escalation. 
 
 145. Id. at 16–17. 
 146. Id. at 16. 
 147. SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT, supra note 79, at 4. 
 148. Peter Beaumont, What Britain Could Learn from Portugal’s Drugs Policy, THE 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 4, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/05/portugal-drugs-de-
bate. 
 149. Id. 
 150. DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION IN PORTUGAL, supra note 80, at 16. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Manuel Pinto Coelho, Decriminalization of Drugs in Portugal – The Real Facts!, WORLD 
FED’N AGAINST DRUGS (Feb. 2, 2010), http://www.wfad.se/latest-news/1-articles/123-decriminal-
ization-of-drugs-in-portugal—the-real-facts. 
 153. SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT, supra note 79, at 5. 
 154. See DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION IN PORTUGAL, supra note 80, at 11–15. 
 155. Id. at 6. 
 156. What Can We Learn, supra note 84, at 1002. 
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V. CALIFORNIA SHOULD LEAD THE WAY FOR U.S. DRUG REFORM 
States have historically served as laboratories for new policies and 
for assessing political support for new ideas.157 Through state “experi-
ments,” the federal government can learn from legislative successes and 
failures without risking broad national consequences.158 In particular, 
California’s large population, liberal leanings, and diversity make the 
state fertile testing ground for new laws.159 It was the first state to legalize 
medical marijuana with the passage of the Compassionate Use Act of 
1996, which inspired similar state laws nationwide.160 This laid the 
groundwork for over twenty other states to legalize medical marijuana.161 
With such a track record, the state is well positioned to blaze a trail away 
from the failed U.S. drug war, and toward an economically and socially 
rational drug policy. 
Besides providing a learning opportunity for the rest of the nation, 
California has strong state-level reasons to reform its drug policies. Like 
Portugal before enacting decriminalization in 2000, the U.S. is currently 
gripped by a heroin epidemic.162 The Center for Disease Control reports 
that nationwide, heroin use has increased 63% since 2002, and heroin 
overdose death rates have nearly quadrupled.163 California has not been 
spared from this public health crisis. In 2014, opioids were involved in 
28,647 deaths, or 61% of all drug overdose deaths nationwide.164 Exacer-
bating this crisis, a synthetic opioid called fentanyl has made this epi-
demic even more dangerous; the growing ubiquity of fentanyl-tainted 
heroin, which is thirty to fifty times stronger than traditional heroin, is 
causing users, even “experienced” ones, to overdose.165 
 
 157. Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 311. 
 158. See generally id. 
 159. See Culture of California, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Culture_of_Califor-
nia (last updated Feb. 24, 2016). 
 160. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5. 
 161. State Medical Marijuana Laws, supra note 57. 
 162. See generally Christopher M. Jones, et al., Vital Signs: Demographic and Substance Use 
Trends Among Heroin Users — United States, 2002–2013, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (July 10, 2015), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6426a3.htm. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Rose A. Rudd, et al., Increases in Drug and Opioid Overdose Deaths — United States, 
2000-2014, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Jan. 1, 2016), https://www.cdc.gov/
mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6450a3.htm. 
 165. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, 2014 NATIONAL DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT 
SUMMARY 15 (2014). 
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Methamphetamine use is likewise on the rise. In 2014, San Diego 
regained its “Meth Capital of America” title as countywide methamphet-
amine deaths increased by 55% from 2008 to 2012.166 San Diego’s Meth 
Strike Force reported the second highest number of meth deaths in 2012 
since they began keeping records in 1995.167 The San Bernardino police 
report that a pound of “good meth” now costs half what users paid in the 
1990s.168 
Like Portugal, California’s geography and cultural ties make it an 
ideal port of entry for international drug traffickers.169 In 2014, meth sei-
zures reached “unprecedented levels” at California-Mexico borders.170 
Mexican drug cartels supplied 70% of the U.S. meth supply through the 
San Ysidro border crossing alone, making California the primary source 
for methamphetamine nationwide.171 These cartels have formed alliances 
with California prison and street gangs to control trafficking routes and 
distribution rings.172 Cartels continue to battle over smuggling routes, and 
with the recent rise of Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación in Tijuana and 
their rivalry with the Sinaloa Cartel, a surge in homicides has gripped the 
California-Mexico border.173 
California continues to take a criminal justice approach to the pos-
session of drugs for personal use. While the passage of Proposition 47 in 
2014 reduced most drug possession crimes to misdemeanors, this was not 
decriminalization.174 These offenses may still result in arrests, and may 
 
 166. José A. Álvarez, Meth Deaths up Dramatically in County, SAN DIEGO COUNTY NEWS 
CENTER (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.countynewscenter.com/news/meth-deaths-dramatically-
county. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Joe Mozingo, A Gritty Life for Those on the Edge, LOS ANGELES TIMES (June 14, 2015) 
http://graphics.latimes.com/san-bernardino-park/. 
 169. See Sandra Dibble, Record Border Meth Seizures, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (Jan. 3, 
2015), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2015/jan/03/record-border-meth-seizures-cal-
ifornia/. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See Jill Replogle & Fronteras, San Diego Cracks Down on Mexican Meth, Seizures Ex-
pected to Surpass 2012 Records, PBS (Aug. 6, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/san-
diego-biggest-entry-point-for-mexican-meth/. 
 172. See KAMALA D. HARRIS, CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL, GANGS BEYOND BORDERS: 
CALIFORNIA AND THE FIGHT AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME 1–3 (2014). 
 173. Sandra Dibble, A New Force in Drug Trafficking Reaches Tijuana, Los Angeles Times 
(Feb. 21, 2106), http://www.latimes.com/world/mexico-americas/la-fg-mexico-tijuana-cartel-
20160221-story.html. 
 174. MAC TAYLOR, IMPLEMENTATION OF PROPOSITION 47 6 (2015), http://
www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2015/budget/prop47/implementation-prop47-021715.pdf (last visited 
June 2016) (“Under Proposition 47, possession for personal use of most illegal drugs (such as co-
caine or heroin) is always a misdemeanor crime. Previously, such a crime was a misdemeanor, a 
wobbler, or a felony—depending on the amount and type of drug”). 
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still burden our court and penal system with prison sentences up to one 
year.175  In addition, drug possession for sale remains a felony, and be-
cause California’s laws don’t define a bright line between possession for 
personal use and possession for sale, there remains ample room for dis-
criminatory sentencing.176 For example, courts may consider two grams 
of heroin as mere personal use for one case, but possession for sale for 
the next.177 While Proposition 47 was a commendable effort to decrease 
the prison population, it is a far cry from Portugal’s strategy of de-stig-
matizing drug crime and emphasizing harm reduction techniques over 
penalties. Under the revised laws, instead of being prosecuted by the 
D.A., some California users whose drug offenses qualify as “personal 
use” will receive a misdemeanor and will be diverted to drug courts where 
they may seek drug treatment as an alternative to a jail sentence or pro-
bation.178 However, apprehension will still at least result in an arrest rec-
ord and users will still face the stigma imparted from contact with the 
criminal justice system.179 
With substantial criminal justice resources still dedicated to the ap-
prehension of illegal drug use, the overall drug war has cost the golden 
state dearly. By one estimate, the state’s “expenditures attributable to 
drug prohibition” totaled $5,378,683,000 in one year.180 Despite recent 
reforms,181 the state’s prison population stood at 112,300, or 135.8% of 
 
 175. See Gazzar, supra note 71; ACLU, supra note 70, at 9 (reporting that low-level arrests 
rose after Proposition 47 passed). 
 176. People v. Newman, 5 Cal.3d 48, 53, 95 (1971) (conviction for possession for sale may be 
based upon expert testimony regarding quantity and packaging). See also People v. Carter, 55 
Cal.App.4th 1376 (1997). 
 177. Compare Newman, 5 Cal.3d 48, with Carter, 55 Cal.App.4th 1376. 
 178. Janet Gilger-VanderZanden, Did Prop 47 Doom Drug Diversions?, NOLO.COM, 
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/did-prop-47-doom-drug-diversions.html. 
 179. Adam Hudson, California’s Prop. 47 Reduces Prison Sentences but Won’t End Mass In-
carceration, TRUTHOUT (2015), http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/31419-california-s-prop-47-
reduces-prison-sentences-but-won-t-end-mass-incarceration; CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.87 (permits 
the court to order sealing of arrest record, but applicant must wait two years after successful com-
pletion of a diversion program. However, even after a successful petition, the Department of Justice 
can still disseminate the record in response to requests by peace officers and authorized officials). 
 180. JEFFREY A. MIRON & KATHERINE WALDOCK, CATO INSTITUTE, THE BUDGETARY 
IMPACT OF ENDING DRUG PROHIBITION 5 (2010) (most recent year for which data is available). 
However, the passage of Proposition 47 may have reduced this number. For example, the Legisla-
tive Analyst’s office predicted a reduction of 1,900 inmates and an increase of 900 parolees in 
2015–16, with $18 million in savings due to Proposition 47. TAYLOR, supra note 174, at 10. Cali-
fornia’s passage of Proposition 47 has likely had some corrective effect on this number because 
under the new law, more offenders will be diverted away from prison. Id. 
 181. See California’s Changing Prison Population, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL. (2015), 
http://www.ppic.org/main/publication_show.asp?i=702. Reforms have included “public safety re-
alignment,” which transferred authority over non-serious offenders from the state to the counties 
FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/15/2017  8:59 PM 
102 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 40:1 
capacity as of March 2015.182 Outside of prison, 60% of California’s adult 
male population is nonwhite or Latino, but these groups comprise 75% 
of the male prison population: Latinos comprise 42% of the state prison 
population, African Americans are 29%, and other races are 6% of the 
state prison population.183 Among adult men in 2013, African Americans 
were incarcerated at a rate of 4,367 per 100,000, compared to 922 for 
Latinos, 488 for non-Latino whites, and 34 for Asians.184 The imprison-
ment of marijuana offenders alone cost the state $60 million in 2011.185 
In addition to the burdens upon California’s legal system, significant 
healthcare expenditures are currently devoted to treatment for addiction-
related conditions or emergencies. In 2013, California hospitals treated 
more than 11,500 patients suffering an opioid or heroin overdose.186 That 
was a 50% increase from 2006.187 In 2014, there were more than 28,000 
deaths from opioid overdose.188 Overall, the state’s yearly healthcare ex-
penditure for illicit drug use may total $220 million.189 
California’s drug problems are similar to those seen in Portugal 
shortly before decriminalization. Like Portugal, the state’s geography 
makes it ideal for drug trafficking.190 Another similarity can be seen in 
drug-induced deaths: Portugal’s overdose death rate peaked right before 
decriminalization.191 Indeed, one percent of the Portuguese population 
was addicted to heroin.192 Because of these similarities between Califor-
nia’s current drug situation and that of Portugal right before decriminali-
zation, it is reasonable to believe that the state will reap similar benefits 
 
and restricts the re-imprisonment of parole violators. Proposition 47, passed in November 2014, 
reclassifies some drug possession as a misdemeanor instead of a felony. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. MIKE MALES, PH.D., CENTER ON JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, MISDEMEANOR 
MARIJUANA ARRESTS ARE SKYROCKETING 5 (2011) (most recent year for which data available). 
 186. Phillip Reese, See Where California’s Heroin, Opioid Problems Are Worst, SACRAMENTO 
BEE (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.sacbee.com/site-services/databases/article31324532.html. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Prescription Opioid Misuse and Overdose Prevention Workgroup, CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. 
HEALTH (2015), https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Pages/OpioidMisuseWorkgroup.aspx. 
 189. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, 2011 NATIONAL DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT 
SUMMARY 4–5 (2011). Author’s $220 million estimate is based on the Department of Justice’s 
(DOJ) $11 billion estimate concerning annual nationwide “drug-related healthcare costs . . .  in-
cluding both direct and indirect costs related to medical intervention.” Id. Because the DOJ’s esti-
mate was across fifty states, the author’s amount is one fiftieth of the DOJ’s total. 
 190. What Can We Learn, supra note 84, at 1001. 
 191. Id. at 1014. 
 192. See Chris Branch, The U.S. Can Learn From Portugal About Decriminalizing Drugs, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/03/portugal-drug-de-
criminalization_n_6606056.html. 
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from a two-pronged model for drug law reform that is derived from Por-
tugal’s approach. 
VI. APPLYING PORTUGAL’S APPROACH TO THE CALIFORNIA DRUG 
PROBLEM WILL LEAD TO SIGNIFICANT BENEFIT AND SAVINGS 
While the full legalization of marijuana is a worthy experiment, var-
ious states are already testing the legalization waters.193 In light of this 
recent public willingness to innovate new drug policies, California has an 
opportunity to undergo an even more radical experiment with decrimi-
nalization of illicit drugs. With a solid model already developed by Por-
tugal, the state should implement a similar model. This experiment will 
likely prove to other states and the federal government that decriminali-
zation holds vast potential for substantial harm reduction and financial 
savings. 
A. Crunching the Numbers for California 
If California enacts Portuguese-style drug policies—which would 
include decriminalization coupled with healthcare and social programs—
the following is an optimistic hypothetical outcome that assumes Califor-
nia’s results would roughly track those of Portugal. 
1. Decriminalization Will Benefit California’s Law Enforcement and 
Penal System 
Decriminalization would provide the most immediate and dramatic 
benefits to the state’s law enforcement and penal systems. The new poli-
cies would mean that apprehension for drug possession would be ad-
dressed by a panel similar to Portugal’s CDTs instead of by arrest or in-
carceration.194 If Californian decriminalization led to the same dramatic 
decline in arrests seen in Portugal, the state’s drug arrests would drop 
 
 193. Hauser, supra note 4. 
 194. DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION IN PORTUGAL, supra note 80, at 2. 
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from approximately 229,523 per year to 91,809 within a few years of de-
criminalization.195 At approximately $750 per arrest, this decrease would 
save the state over $103 million per year.196 
Portuguese-style drug policies would also provide relief for Califor-
nia’s overcrowded prison system. Inmates convicted for drug-related of-
fenses would decrease from 24,546197 to 19,146 within the first year.198 
This decrease would save the California prison system approximately 
$253,800,000 per year.199 This measure would also help alleviate the 
state’s prison density, which would improve from 135.8% to 132% of 
capacity.200 
2. Decriminalization Will Cause Drug Use to Decline 
A decrease in California drug use would be less dramatic than the 
shifts in numbers for law enforcement and prisons, but still significant. If 
the state’s results are substantially similar to Portuguese numbers, de-
criminalization will cause addiction rates to drop.201 For two critical 
groups—thirteen-to-fifteen and sixteen-to-eighteen year-olds—preva-
lence rates will decline for virtually every substance, with reduction in 
 
 195. Author’s calculation based on Portuguese results. Misdemeanor arrests for 2014 drug of-
fenses in California totalled 92,469, whereas felony arrests for drug offenses in 2014 totaled 
137,054. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN CALIFORNIA 2014 28, 34 (2015). That 
totals 229,523 drug offense related arrests. Portuguese criminal arrests for drug offenses were re-
duced from over 14,000 offenders in 2000 to an average of 5,000–5,500 offenders per year in 2008, 
which is a reduction of approximately 60%. What Can We Learn, supra note 84, at 1008–09. 
 196. ACLU, THE WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE 72 (2013), 
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/aclu-thewaronmarijuana-rel2.pdf. The ACLU conservatively es-
timates the cost per arrest to be $750. Id. With 137,714 fewer arrests at $750 per arrest, savings 
total $103,285,500 per year. See CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 195, at 28, 34; 
What Can We Learn, supra note 84, at 1008–09. 
 197. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, CALIFORNIA 
PRISONERS AND PAROLEES 16 (2011).   
 198. Author’s calculation based on Portuguese results. Between 2000 and 2010, Portugal’s 
convicted prisoners serving time for a drug related offense decreased from 43% to 21%—a 22% 
decrease. Hannah Laqueur, Uses and Abuses of Drug Decriminalization in Portugal, 40 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 746, 757 (2015). Author’s estimated figure of 19,146 prisoners is a 22% decrease 
from the Department of Corrections figure of 24,546 prisoners. CALIFORNIA PRISONERS AND 
PAROLEES, supra note 197, at 16. 
 199. In 2008, it cost an average of about $47,000 per year to incarcerate an inmate in prison in 
California. Chris Nichols, Did California Spend $5 Billion to Execute 13 People?, POLITIFACT 
CALIFORNIA (Sept. 21, 2016), http://www.politifact.com/california/statements/2016/sep/21/tom-
steyer/did-california-spend-5-billion-execute-13-people/. Author’s estimate is therefore based on a 
reduction of 5,400 prisoners, at $47,000 per prisoner. 
 200. As of March 2015, California’s prison population stood at 112,300, or 135.8% of capacity. 
California’s Changing Prison Population, supra note 181. Author estimates that if inmates con-
victed for drug-related offenses decreased from 24,546 to 19,146, total state prison density would 
decrease to 132%. 
 201. DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION IN PORTUGAL, supra note 80, at 11–12. 
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some substances as dramatic as 50%.202 For the critical fifteen-to-nineteen 
year age group, prevalence rates will decrease in absolute terms.203 For 
some older age groups, there may be a slight increase in drug usage.204 
However, such an increase in lifetime prevalence rates for the larger pop-
ulation is expected in every nation, regardless of drug policies, due to the 
cohort effect.205 
3. Decriminalization Will Benefit the Healthcare System 
If California’s reduction in diseases and deaths due to drug use were 
to mirror Portuguese results, the state’s healthcare system would benefit 
significantly. For example, newly reported cases of HIV among injection 
drug users would decrease from 278 per year to 64 per year, with a sav-
ings of over $5.5 million to California’s Medicaid costs alone.206 The de-
crease in new AIDS cases among injection drug users would likewise 
lead to Medicaid savings of over $4.5 million.207 Deaths due to drug use 
 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 12. 
 204. Id.   
 205. Id. (“[O]lder people that never try drugs are replaced for a new generation among whom 
a significant percentage already had that experience.”). 
 206. These figures are based on Author’s estimate.  In six years, Portugal’s newly reported 
cases of HIV among drug users decreased from approximately 1,380 cases per year to approxi-
mately 310 cases per year. Id. at 16 (fig. 8). This was a decrease of approximately 77%. See id. In 
2013, there were 4,636 newly diagnosed HIV cases in California. HIV Surveillance Report, 2013, 
CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 66 (table 18), https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/pdf/li-
brary/reports/surveillance/cdc-hiv-surveillance-report-2013-vol-25.pdf. In 2015, 6% of the 39,513 
new HIV cases in the U.S. were attributed to injection drug use (IDU). HIV and Injection Drug Use 
in the United States, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/risk/idu.html. Assuming the percentage of new HIV cases in California 
attributed to IDU is consistent with the national percentage, Author calculates that 278 of the 4,636 
newly diagnosed HIV cases in California were attributed to IDU. Decreasing this number by 77%—
the decrease seen in Portugal—the number of newly diagnosed HIV cases attributed to IDU in 
California would become just 64. See DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION IN PORTUGAL, supra note 80, at 
16 (fig. 8). In 2011, California’s annual Medicaid spending per enrollee with HIV/AIDS was 
$25,823. Medicaid Enrollment and Spending on HIV/AIDS, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, 
http://kff.org/hivaids/state-indicator/enrollment-spending-on-hiv/. At $25,823 per 214 fewer HIV 
cases, the state would save an estimated $5,526,122. 
 207. This figure is based on Author’s estimate. In six years, Portugal’s newly reported cases of 
AIDS among drug users decreased from approximately 550 cases per year to approximately 180 
cases per year. DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION IN PORTUGAL, supra note 80, at 16 (fig. 8). This marks 
a decrease of approximately 67%. See id. In 2011, there were 2,655 newly diagnosed AIDS cases 
in California. 2012 Annual HIV Surveillance Report, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES PUB. HEALTH 4, 
http://publichealth.lacounty.gov/wwwfiles/ph/hae/hiv/2012AnnualHIVSurveillanceReport.pdf. In 
2015, 10% of the 18,303 new AIDS cases in the U.S. were attributed to IDU. HIV and Injection 
Drug Use in the United States, supra note 209. Assuming the percentage of new AIDS cases in 
California attributed to IDU is consistent with the national percentage, Author calculates that 265 
of the total 2,655 new AIDS diagnosed cases were attributed to IDU.  Decreasing this number by 
67%—the decrease seen in Portugal—the number of newly diagnosed AIDS cases attributed to 
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would decrease from approximately 4,500 per year to 3,510, saving the 
state over $16 million.208 
4. Decriminalization Will Reduce Collateral Consequences 
Beyond the benefits to the penal and healthcare systems, decrimi-
nalization will offer further benefits to California’s budget. Portuguese-
style CDTs are likely to be less expensive than criminal courts, or even 
our current drug courts, because they would not require the same amount 
of resources to process a case through its early stages: there would be no 
need for arrests, charging decisions, setting bail or public defenders.209 
Removing arrests from the picture would have the added benefit of elim-
inating the economic and human consequences of removing a user from 
public and family life.210 Also, CDTs often impose fines, which would 
help offset their costs.211 
Health Services Research found that on average, California sub-
stance abuse treatment costs the state $1,583 per patient.212 However, 
when this treatment replaces incarceration, it produces a monetary benefit 
of $11,487 per patient, representing a ratio greater than 7:1 of benefits to 
costs.213 These benefits are primarily due to reduced costs associated with 
crime and increased employment earnings.214 If California provided sub-
 
IDU in California would become just 88. See DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION IN PORTUGAL, supra 
note 80, at 16 (fig. 8). In 2011, California’s annual Medicaid spending per enrollee with HIV/AIDS 
was $25,823. Medicaid Enrollment and Spending on HIV/AIDS, supra note 206, at $25,823. At 
$25,823 per 177 fewer AIDS cases, the state would save an estimated $4,570,671. 
 208. This figure is based on Author’s estimate. About 4,500 Californians died following drug 
poisoning in 2014. Phillip Reese, Two maps that illustrate California’s growing opioid epidemic, 
SACRAMENTO BEE (Jan. 27, 2013), http://www.sacbee.com/site-services/databases/arti-
cle56168810.html. Portuguese drug overdoses decreased from 280 in 2001 to 216 in 2006—a 22% 
decrease. DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION IN PORTUGAL, supra note 80, at 17. If California drug deaths 
decreased at this rate, it follows that the number of deaths would fall to approximately 3,510. Con-
sidering California hospital costs in 2011 for “illicit drug-induced illnesses” were $16,588 per 
event, the state would save roughly $16,422,120. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ILLICIT DRUG USE, supra 
note 54, at 24. 
 209. See generally Susan L Ettner et al., Benefit–Cost in the California Treatment Outcome: 
Does Substance Abuse Treatment ‘‘Pay for Itself’’?, 41 HEALTH SERV. RES. 192 (2006), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1681530/pdf/hesr041-0192.pdf. 
 210. The Decriminalization Option, supra note 20, at 331. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Ettner et al., supra note 209, at 205. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
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stance abuse treatment instead of incarceration for the people appre-
hended and incarcerated for drug possession, the state would save almost 
$97 million per year.215 
VII. OBSTACLES 
Decriminalizing the possession of all illicit drugs in California will 
be met with social, cultural, and legal obstacles. First, due to recent lib-
eralization of the state’s drug laws, the public may not perceive an urgent 
need for reform.216 Even if advocates can convince the public that further 
liberalization is necessary despite the state’s recent reforms, cultural dif-
ferences between California and Portugal may raise doubt that the state 
will see similar successes from decriminalization.217 Lastly, there may be 
legal questions as to whether decriminalization conflicts with federal 
drug laws, and whether the state and federal governments can reach a 
tenable solution.218 However, these are not insurmountable obstacles and 
decriminalization can ultimately prevail. 
A. Decreased Public Perceptions that California’s Drug Laws Need 
Reform May Hinder Decriminalization 
First, California voters’ passage of Proposition 47 in 2014 may have 
created a public perception of de facto decriminalization of drug posses-
sion that will alleviate problems associated with the state’s drug war.219 
After all, the measure transformed drug possession into a misdemeanor 
and reduced maximum sentences to one year in jail.220 While a positive 
step, the measure does not go far enough and may even create new prob-
lems. For example, experts tout California drug courts as an effective al-
ternative to prison for treating addicts, partially because these drug courts 
 
 215. This figure is based on Author’s estimate. Inmates convicted for drug-related offenses in 
2010 totaled 8,445. CALIFORNIA PRISONERS AND PAROLEES, supra note 197, at 16. Treatment in 
place of incarceration can provide a monetary benefit of $11,478 per individual. See Ettner et al., 
supra note 209, at 205. With $11,478 in monetary benefits for each of 8,445 treated offenders, the 
state would save $96,931,710. 
 216. Paige St. John & Marisa Gerber, Prop 47 jolts landscape of California justice system, LOS 
ANGELES TIMES (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/politics/la-me-ff-pol-proposi-
tion47-20141106-story.html. 
 217. A Decade After Drug Decriminalization, supra note 89, at 26–27. 
 218. See generally Steven B. Duke, The Future of Marijuana in the United States, 91 OR. L. 
REV. 1301 (2013). 
 219. St. John & Gerber, supra note 216. 
 220. Marisa Gerber, Prop. 47 may keep addicts from using drug court’s treatment program, 
LOS ANGELES TIMES, (Dec. 2014), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-adv-drug-court-
20141214-story.html. 
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refer offenders to drug treatment programs.221 However, Proposition 47 
has “changed the calculus of drug courts,” since some users would not 
agree to a treatment program without a “felony hanging over [their] 
head[s].” 222 
In addition to Proposition 47, the existence of drug courts may be 
another reason for the public to feel that drug possession has already been 
per se decriminalized in California. After all, these courts often redirect 
users into treatment instead of prison.223 However, drug courts are still 
part of the criminal system, and this marriage leads to inefficiencies.224 
For example, some users who do not have a drug abuse problem will still 
have an incentive to obtain treatment just to avoid criminal penalties.225 
On the flip side, serious drug addicts may be counseled by their attorneys 
to avoid a mandated treatment program because the light prison sentence 
they would face does not justify the burdens of a drug court.226 In these 
ways, drug courts may waste resources on casual users, while allowing 
problem users to escape treatment. 
In contrast, Portuguese CDTs are civil, not criminal.227 The panel 
therefore may address each user’s treatment needs instead of approaching 
each case in the context of a punishment.228 CDTs have great discretion 
in determining each case’s outcome. They have the flexibility to decide 
the cost of sanctions, and are prohibited from imposing sanctions on non-
problematic users.229 In these ways, CDTs can address drug use more ef-
ficiently and effectively than the court system. 
B. Geographic and Cultural Differences May Hinder 
Decriminalization 
Portugal and California are geographically and culturally distinct 
from each other, which raises the question of whether Portuguese policies 
would result in the same outcomes for California.230 For example, Cali-
fornia has three times Portugal’s population and the state’s population 
 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. Nevertheless, some argue “the initiative will ensure that treatment beds are available 
for addicts who want them, not those trying to avoid incarceration.” Id. 
 223. The Decriminalization Option, supra note 20, at 311. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 312. 
 226. Id. 
 227. DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION IN PORTUGAL, supra note 80, at 2. 
 228. The Decriminalization Option, supra note 20, at 327. 
 229. DRUG DECRIMINALIZATION IN PORTUGAL, supra note 80, at 2. 
 230. List of U.S. states by population density, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipe-
dia.org/wiki/List_of_U.S._states_by_population_density (last modified Jan. 2016). 
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density is more than twice that of Portugal.231 And at over four times Por-
tugal’s geographical size, Californians would face the formidable task of 
establishing a system of panels that is accessible to all.232 Economically, 
this comparatively wider network may not be an insurmountable barrier. 
After all, the International Monetary Fund estimates that California’s 
GDP is over nine times that of Portugal.233 
However, Portuguese CDTs are provided by the country’s Ministry 
of Health using a single payer healthcare system.234 With most Californi-
ans covered by a wide variety of privately insured healthcare plans, the 
state will be challenged with organizing CDT-style panels that are acces-
sible to all residents. But California’s successful implementation of a 
state healthcare exchange in 2013, under the Affordable Care Act, may 
signal a legislative proficiency for retooling the state’s healthcare sys-
tem.235 Furthermore, in late 2015, the legislature reached an agreement to 
create a new state office that, along with cities, will issue medical mari-
juana licenses.236 This may prove the legislature’s willingness to invest in 
the type of statewide resources that are required to innovate drug laws. 
California may not have the same groundswell of support for liber-
alized drug laws that existed in Portugal shortly before passage of law 
30/2000, which may pose another obstacle for state drug decriminaliza-
tion. After all, a widespread recognition in Portugal that addiction should 
be approached as a public health problem led to the formation of the Com-
mission for a National Drug Strategy, which made recommendations that 
led to the country’s two-pronged approach for fighting the growing drug 
epidemic.237 Additionally, experts attribute the program’s success to the 
Portuguese public’s recognition that addicts should be treated, not stig-
matized as social outcasts.238 For the Portuguese model to be effective in 
California, the change may require a concerted campaign to change pub-
lic attitudes towards addiction. 
 
 231. Id.   
 232. List of U.S. states and territories by area, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipe-
dia.org/wiki/List_of_U.S._states_and_territories_by_area (last modified Dec. 2015). 
 233. Comparison between U.S. states and countries by GDP (nominal), WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comparison_between_U.S._states_and_coun-
tries_by_GDP_(nominal) (last modified Dec. 2015). 
 234. Helen Redmond, Portugal and the drug war, AL-JAZEERA (Nov. 23, 2011), 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/11/201111211444824612.html. 
 235. Covered California, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Covered_California (last 
modified Mar. 2016). 
 236. Patrick McGreevey, California lawmakers reach agreement on regulating medical mari-
juana, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Sept. 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-pc-law-
makers-agreement-regulating-medical-marijuana-20150910-story.html. 
 237. A Decade After Drug Decriminalization, supra note 89, at 26–27. 
 238. Id. 
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C. Conflicts Between State Decriminalization and Federal Prohibition 
May Hinder Decriminalization 
If California decriminalized drug possession, this new measure 
could conflict with Federal law.239 This would not, however, be an insur-
mountable obstacle, as demonstrated by recent state laws legalizing ma-
rijuana for medical purposes or for recreation, and the recent trend of fed-
eral toleration of these experimental laws.240 However, beyond simply 
hoping for the federal government’s toleration of reformed state laws, ar-
guments against federal preemption may provide further protections for 
state-level drug decriminalization. Furthermore, cooperative federalism 
may provide a sustainable solution to the conflict. 
California legalized medical marijuana in 1996, despite the federal 
Controlled Substance Act’s categorization of marijuana as a Schedule I 
drug.241 After a rocky start with federal authorities,242 Attorney General 
Eric Holder in 2009 announced that the Department of Justice would not 
prosecute medical marijuana dispensaries conforming to state law, and 
instructed federal prosecutors to cease targeting marijuana dealers who 
were in compliance with their respective state law.243 Showing further 
promise of federal cooperation with state-level drug law reform, when 
several states recently legalized marijuana for recreational use,244 Presi-
dent Obama remarked that, “it would not make sense for us to see a top 
priority as going after recreational users in states that have determined 
that it’s legal . . . We’ve got bigger fish to fry.”245 
Despite these promising remarks, a regulatory conflict between Cal-
ifornia’s decriminalization and federal drug laws would still exist, and 
the federal government may still decide to crack down on state decrimi-
nalization measures that conflict with federal drug law.246 However, var-
ious legal precedents exist for arguing the federal government should not 
interfere with state-level experiments with drug regulations. 
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1. Federal Preemption and Anti-commandeering 
The Department of Justice could seek a Supreme Court ruling that 
state laws decriminalizing drug possession are preempted by Federal law, 
and therefore void under the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, which 
states that federal laws take precedence over state laws.247 However, de-
criminalization advocates may undermine the federal government’s 
preemption argument by questioning whether these liberalized state laws 
truly create a conflict with state law; that is, whether the laws authorize 
or advocate violations of federal law.248 After all, implementation of the 
Portuguese decriminalization model, which requires users to come before 
a CDT-style dissuasion panel, still comports with the spirit of education 
and deterrence behind federal drug prohibition.249 Additionally, advocates 
may argue that the anti-commandeering principle allows states to consti-
tutionally decide against criminalizing conduct under state law, even if 
such conduct violates federal law.250 In other words, while California 
could not stop the federal government from enforcing federal drug laws 
within the state, federal authorities may not command California to crim-
inalize drug possession under state law.251 State decisions to decriminal-
ize drugs should be beyond the control of the federal government. 
However, even if California prevails in the anti-commandeering 
battle, the federal government could still decide to enforce federal drug 
laws within the state or attempt to force state compliance.252 For these 
reasons, simply prohibiting the federal government from commandeering 
state law may be ineffective, and cooperative federalism may be a more 
sustainable solution. 
2. Cooperative Federalism 
Instead of a battle over preemption and anti-commandeering, the 
California legislature and the federal government could proactively hash 
out a collaborative plan for evolving drug regulations at the state level. A 
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cooperative federalism approach would allow states meeting broad fed-
eral criteria to opt out of parts of federal law that criminalize drug use253 
and to exert control over drug possession within their own borders.254 This 
framework would serve the interests of problem solving and efficiency, 
allowing these lawmaking bodies to work in harmony, instead of con-
flict.255 Under this model, drug possession would not only be decriminal-
ized under California’s laws, but also would not violate federal law within 
the state.256 Various federal statutes already provide precedents for this 
model of cooperative federalism. Notably, The Clean Air and Clean Wa-
ter Acts are structured around the idea of cooperative federalism.257 The 
underlying purposes of the CAA and CWA emphasize cooperation be-
tween federal and state governments to prevent pollution.258 Accordingly, 
the CAA grants each state primary responsibility for the air quality within 
its borders, but if states fail to act, then federal regulations apply.259 This 
model could easily apply to state drug laws by allowing states to promul-
gate their own standards, as long as those standards fall within certain 
federal guidelines. 
Cooperative federalism would allow the federal government to in-
fluence the direction of legislative reform without commandeering the 
state legislature. The plan’s flexibility would also allow for experimental 
variation in state laws, which would enable diverse experiments among 
states to tease out the most effective drug laws. These results would help 
inform other states, and ultimately the federal government, regarding the 
best practices for de-escalation of the U.S. drug war. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The U.S. Drug War is an outdated and costly response to the drug 
epidemic. Public funds are frequently devoted to a criminal justice ap-
proach for handling low-level drug offenders, and relatively scant re-
sources are spent on harm reduction techniques such as drug treatment 
and outreach.260 This war has resulted in heavy burdens for U.S. courts, 
penal systems and healthcare systems.261 Furthermore, drug war policies 
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have exacerbated social marginalization and aggravate high-risk behav-
iors among users.262 It is time for a more effective and less expensive ap-
proach to handling drug use.   
Recent U.S. attempts, especially those at the state level, to liberalize 
drug laws show public and legislative willingness to liberalize drug laws, 
and have paved the way for further legislative innovation.263 Portuguese 
drug decriminalization can provide a proven model for moving forward 
with progressive reform. With the country’s two-pronged approach—
drug dissuasion panels coupled with harm reduction through public 
health measures—Portugal has shown this reformed model can alleviate 
both the economic and public health problems associated with drug use.264 
California, with its history of trailblazing marijuana laws, is well 
poised to provide the laboratory to implement such a model. By following 
Portugal’s lead by decriminalizing possession for all illicit substances, 
the state may reap significant rewards. To name a few, the state may see 
40% fewer drug arrests,265 a drop in prevalence rates for drug use,266 and 
over $2 million in Medicaid savings.267 Overall, calculating the total sav-
ings estimated in Section IV, supra, California’s budget may see rewards 
of over $480 million in the first few years after decriminalization. 
If California decriminalizes drug possession, this change could col-
lide with federal law. However, governments may use the cooperative 
federalism model provided by the federal Clean Air Act and Clean Water 
Act to avoid conflicts between state-level drug decriminalization and fed-
eral drug laws. After all, encouraging experimental drug law reform at 
the state level will help the remaining U.S. states, and ultimately the fed-
eral government, to implement smarter, more effective laws that will al-
leviate drug war casualties. California can and should lead the nation 
away from its destructive criminal justice approach towards drug posses-
sion. 
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